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Abstract
How the income of "relevant others" a⁄ects well-being has received renewed
interest in the recent literature using subjective data. Migrants constitutes a par-
ticularly interesting group to study this question: as they changed environment,
they are likely to be concerned by several potential reference groups including the
people "left behind", other migrants and "natives". We focus here on the huge
population of rural-to-urban migrants in China. We exploit a novel dataset that
comprises samples of migrants and urban people living in the same cities, as well as
rural households mostly surveyed in the provinces where migrants are coming from.
After establishing these links, we ￿nd that the well-being of migrants is largely af-
fected by relative concerns: results point to negative relative concerns toward other
migrants and workers of home regions ￿this status e⁄ect is particularly strong for
migrants who wish to settle permanently in cities. We ￿nd in contrast a positive
relative income e⁄ect vis-￿-vis the urban reference group, interpreted as a signal
e⁄ect: larger urban incomes indicate higher income prospects for the migrants. A
richer pattern is obtained when sorting migrants according to the duration of stay,
expectations to return to home countries and characteristics related to family cir-
cumstances, work conditions and community ties.
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It is well-known today that utilities depend not only on absolute income but also the
income relative to others. The issue of relative concerns was already discussed by Adam
Smith, Karl Marx and several scholars in the past (Veblen, 1899, Duesenberry, 1949)
and has been revisited in the recent literature on self-reported subjective well-being (e.g.,
Clark and Oswald, 1996; McBride, 2001; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005; Senik,
2004, 2008; PØrez-Asenjo, 2010; see also the survey of Clark et al., 2008) or tailor-made
survey experiments (e.g., Solnick and Hemenway 1998; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002;
Alpizar et al., 2005). In surveys where people are asked about their level of well-being, it
is intuitive to think that they form an answer after evaluating their position relative to
the income of others. The income of a reference group may negatively a⁄ect subjective
well-being (SWB) if people feel relatively deprived: this so-called "status e⁄ect", re￿ ecting
envy and jealousy, generally prevails in empirical studies on developed countries.1 The
more limited literature about relative concerns in developing and transition economies
shows more mixed results.2 A positive relative concern is sometimes reported, e.g., in the
case of Chinese rural areas (see Knight al., 2009). This can be interpreted as a sign of tight
community ties and altruistic preferences among poor rural households (see Bookwalter
and Dalenberg, 2010, for South Africa). Alternatively, it may reveal a ￿signal e⁄ect￿(or
"tunnel e⁄ect", in the sense of Hirchmann, 1973), i.e., my well-being is positively a⁄ected
by the observation of other people￿ s faster income progression if I interpret this movement
as a sign that my own turn will come around soon. Opposite e⁄ects, envy (status e⁄ects)
and ambition (signal e⁄ect), may o⁄set each other, and their relative weight depends in
particular on beliefs about social mobility, as extensively discussed by Senik (2008).
A crucial aspect in this literature is the notion of the reference group. It is cer-
tainly di¢ cult to identify the relevant group for a given population or to understand
how comparisons are formed and evolve over time or with individual aspirations and eco-
nomic circumstances. The literature has suggested di⁄erent orbits of comparison based
on spatial proximity and other dimensions (see McBride, 2001; Clark and Oswald, 1996;
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005).3 In this context, internal migrants o⁄er an interesting case
1A negative e⁄ect of relative income on SWB is found almost systematically in a series of papers: Clark
and Oswald (1996); McBride (2001); Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005); Luttmer (2005); Senik (2004, 2008). See
also the enlightening survey Clark et al., (2008).
2See Graham and Pettinato (2002) on Peru and Russia; Kingdon and Knight (2006, 2007) and Book-
walter and Dalenberg (2010) on South Africa; Akay and Martinsson (2010) on Ethiopia; and Ravallion
and Lokshin (2001, 2002) on Russia; see Graham (2005) for a helpful overview. There is a particularly
burgeoning literature on China, which we shall cite at relevant locations in this paper.
3We are aware of only three studies in which people are asked directly to whom they compare them-
1study. Migrant workers are indeed placed in di⁄erent geographical, social and economic
environments. Confronted with di⁄erent types of populations and di⁄erent set of oppor-
tunities, they may refer to several potential reference groups. In this paper we investigate
this question by focusing on rural-to-urban migrants in China. Chinese internal migration
is a unique experience in human history and may well be one of the greatest migration
events ever to have taken place (Cai et al., 2008). This o⁄ers a particular ground to rela-
tive concerns, as demonstrated in this paper. Upon arriving in an urban region, migrants
have at least three possible sub-populations to compare themselves to: rural workers in
home provinces, other migrants living in the same city and urban residents with whom
they interact. To check whether these potential comparison groups statistically a⁄ect mi-
grants￿well-being, we make use of a novel dataset that pools samples of rural individuals,
urban individuals and migrants. The migrant-speci￿c section of the dataset, collected in
2008, was designed to provide a recent and representative picture of Chinese migrants.
Compared to previous surveys, it is not limited to a geographically restricted sample but
covers the main emigration provinces and immigration cities in China, and all types of
migrants. Most interestingly, urban and migrant workers are surveyed in the same cities
(the main immigration destinations in China) and the rural workers are mainly located
in provinces where observed migrants are coming from. Establishing these links allows us
to test the impact of di⁄erent comparison groups on migrant SWB in a systematic and
comprehensive manner. To address the high degree of heterogeneity among migrants, we
cross this evidence with a time dimension, i.e., investigate how relative concerns change
with the time since ￿rst migration, with information about the desired duration of stay
and with many other characteristics related to family background, work conditions and
social networks.4
Our results can be summarized as follows. We begin analyzing the determinants of
SWB among rural workers, migrants and urban workers separately.5 Since the exact
reference groups for each population is unknown, this ￿rst step aims to investigate the
relative concerns of Chinese workers using various relevant (or irrelevant) reference groups.
selves: Clark and Senik (2010), Senik (2009) and Knight et al. (2009).
4Another paper has recently studied internal migration and SWB in China (Knight and Gunatilaka,
2010a). The authors focus speci￿cally on the welfare gap between migrants and urban and rural people.
Despite migrants moving to cities in search of a better life, they may have false expectations about their
future achievement or be confronted with a change in aspirations as their reference group changes. The
authors provide interesting evidence along these lines, but neither this paper nor the limited literature
on SWB in transition economies provides a systematic examination of the role of di⁄erent, potential
reference groups, as suggested here.
5Appleton and Song (2009) and Gao and Smyth (2010) speci￿cally study SWB in urban China. Knight
et al. (2009) focus on rural China. Knight and Gunatilaka (2010b) study the rural-urban divide.
2We con￿rm previous ￿ndings that relative concerns matter in China. There is some
evidence that rural people have positive relative concerns toward other rural (see Knight
et al., 2009). In contrast, urban residents and migrants seem to behave more closely
to the pattern found in developed countries, i.e., they experience a strong status e⁄ect
when comparing themselves to other urban/migrants. We then examine the core results
of the paper and focus speci￿cally on migrants￿relative concerns. We examine the role
of di⁄erent, possibly simultaneous, reference groups. Results indicate negative relative
concerns toward other migrants and rural workers of home regions, i.e., a status e⁄ect.
In contrast, we ￿nd a positive and highly signi￿cant relative income e⁄ect vis-￿-vis the
urban reference group. After ruling out altruism or externalities as possible explanations,
we suggest a "signal" interpretation for the latter e⁄ect: more successful urban natives
indicate higher chances of prosperity for migrants in the future. Finally, we decrease the
degree of heterogeneity within the migrant population by sorting migrants according to
the duration of stay, expectations to return to home regions and other characteristics
linked to family circumstances, assimilation skills and job prospects. In particular, the
desire to stay in the urban region, and hence forming or leaving a reference group, has
a noticeable impact on our results. Migrants who wish to settle permanently in urban
regions show the strongest status e⁄ect. Yet this decreases over time, re￿ ecting a possible
switch in reference groups or selection among workers who aim to stay. Status e⁄ect
toward other migrants becomes weaker when the reference group comprises migrants of
the same source region, which conveys community ties play a role in urban regions as
well.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
historical background on Chinese migration and the data used. Section 3 presents the
empirical approach. Results are reported and discussed in Section 4, where we compare
relative concerns of rural, urban and migrants. We focus on migrants in Section 5 and
conclude with Section 6.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Background on Chinese Rural-to-Urban Migration
The ￿rst stage of Chinese internal migration started after that the Chinese Communist
Party came to power in 1949. Up until 1957, the rural labor force was allowed to migrate
freely from rural to urban areas. In this period, the number of employees in urban areas,
as a result of migration rose from 5:1 to 23:2 million employees, most of them coming
from rural regions. During the "Great Leap Forward", in 1958 to 1960, the population of
3migrant workers increased quickly and the urban labor force reached around 29 million.
However, owing to serious energy and resource allocation de￿ciencies, a large number of
migrant workers returned to their rural hometowns during 1961 to 1963. Restrictions on
rural-to-urban migration were implemented with the hukou system (Household Registra-
tion System), whereby the government strictly controlled the internal transfer of labor.
As a result, only a small population of rural workers was able to move to urban areas
during 1964 to 1978. Economic reforms implemented in China after 1978 increased the
agricultural outcomes, and during the following decade many township enterprises devel-
oped and become the main source of employment for rural workers. Some migrant workers
even returned to agriculture between 1989 and 1991. After Deng￿ s Southern Tour Speech,
in 1992, the Chinese economy and, in particular, highly labor-intensive industrial sectors
developed rapidly, leading to high labor demand. In addition, a growing inequality in
living standards between rural and urban regions and changes in the hukou regulation
contributed to a dramatic acceleration of rural-to-urban migration witnessed in the past
two decades. The total migrant labor force employed in secondary and tertiary industries
was estimated to be 230 million in 2009, including 145 million workers who migrated from
their home province, 30 million of whom left with their entire family.6.
2.2 Data and Selection
The empirical analysis in this paper uses the Rural to Urban Migration in China and
Indonesia (RUMICI) dataset drawn from a novel survey covering rural and urban regions
of China and Indonesia. It gathers a wealth of information on rural, urban and migrant
households and is probably the most representative survey on urban and migrant house-
holds in China (see a detailed description and some applications in Meng et al., 2010).
Previous surveys also contained SWB information notably the 2002 Chinese Household
Income Project (CHIP data) used for instance by Appleton and Song (2009). Yet the
o¢ cial sampling frame of the CHIP largely excluded those without urban hukou regis-
tration and particularly most of the "￿ oating population" of rural￿ urban migrants. For
this reason, another survey was speci￿cally collected to gather information on migrant
neighborhoods in some of the selected cities of the CHIP for the year 2002. However, it
covered only ￿ve provinces (see Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010a; Gusta⁄son et al., 2008; Qu
and Zhao, 2011, for an extensive comparison between RUMICI and this previous migrant
survey).
The RUMICI dataset has bene￿ted from these previous experiences.7 The survey cov-
6National Bureau of Statistics of China (2009): see www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20100319_402628281.htm.
7The consortium (see acknowledgements) piloting this survey includes some of the aforementioned
4ers the 10 largest provinces sending and receiving migrants (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang,
Hubei, Sichuan, Guangdong, Henan, Anhui, Sichuan and Hebei), and migrants were ran-
domly chosen from the 15 top immigration destinations (cities) in China.8 It provides
an accurate representation of the migrant population, including long-term migrants and
temporary workers. It is designed as a ￿ve-year longitudinal survey conducted at the
household level and started in 2008. Panel information should become available in the
coming years. In this paper we use only the ￿rst wave, for 2008, which covers 18;000
Chinese households. The dataset is composed of three distinct samples: ￿rural￿ , ￿urban￿
and ￿migrant￿ . All three samples gather information on household and personal char-
acteristics, detailed health-status, employment, income, training and education of adults
and children, social networks, family and social relationships, life events, mental health
measures of the individuals and, for migrants, information related to migration history.
In the survey a migrant is de￿ned as an individual who is registered in a rural area (rural
hukou) but lived in an urban region in 2008. The urban sample contains households who
have lived in the urban regions for generations and can be treated as ￿natives￿compared
to rural-to-urban migrants.
This paper considers the direct and relative e⁄ect of individual labor income on SWB.
Hence, we select workers aged between 16 and 70 who are the head of a household. The
unemployed are not included, as they represent a small proportion of our sample and
form the main stock of return migration (Bai and Song, 2002). More importantly, we
aim to focus on labor income rather than overall standard of living. Examining personal
labor income captures other dimensions likely to a⁄ect well-being, including a worker￿ s
success in the labor market in relation to own expectations and achievement. As explained
below, we aim to test the relevance of reference income de￿ned as the income of one￿ s
professional peers (see also Senik, 2008). After eliminating some households due to missing
information, we obtain a working sample of 2;180 rural workers, 1;863 urban workers and
4;879 migrants. The distribution of selected workers by type and across di⁄erent provinces
is reported in Table 1. All provinces contain the three types with two exceptions: the 9th
province, Hebei, is a purely rural province in our data, and there are no rural samples
authors involved in the previous 2002 migrant survey. The questionnaire of the RUMICI survey is partly
based on that of the 2002 survey.
8The various de￿nitions of reference groups used in this paper are primarily based on geographical
proximity or origin. Hence, the boundaries of provinces and districts/cities, the two main entities used, are
important. Provinces are de￿ned according to o¢ cial administrative boundaries. A smaller geographical
entity is referred to as a "district" hereafter. For urban and migrant workers it is close to the notion of
"city" but is based on the density of economic activity and workplaces ￿hence, it is somewhat smaller
than the administrative boundaries of Chinese cities. Rural populations in the data are located in regions
beyond the survey boundaries of the city where only rural people live.
5for the 6th province, Shanghai. The important aspect of the data is that (i) migrants
are sampled in the same cities as urban households; (ii) a majority of rural households
are located in provinces where migrants are coming from. On that second point, the last
column of Table 1 reports the number of migrants by province of origin. A total of 4;536
migrant household heads are identi￿ed as having migrated from the same provinces as
our rural sample, whilst 732 have come from other provinces.





Henan 1 205 23% 302 34% 543 43% 1050 742
Jiangsu 2 243 20% 385 41% 577 39% 1205 533
Sinhuan 3 221 26% 232 34% 384 40% 837 585
Hubei 4 116 19% 156 32% 391 49% 663 487
Anhui 5 225 24% 204 31% 536 45% 965 872
Shanghai 6 237 36% 0 0% 493 64% 730 2
Zhejiang 7 243 23% 490 38% 567 40% 1300 190
Guangdong 8 251 21% 222 17% 992 62% 1465 343
Hebei 9 0 0% 101 100% 0 0% 101 27
Chongqing 10 122 22% 88 18% 395 60% 605 23
732
1,863 2,180 4,878 8,921 4,536
Others
Urban Rural Migrants Province
2.3 Measure of Well-Being and Descriptive Statistics
We make use of the GHQ-12 measure of mental health, which is based on 12 questions of
the General Health Questionnaire. To construct SWB measure, we sum up the answers
to the 12 GHQ questions (each of them coded from 1 to 4), as reported in Appendix A.
The lowest score is 12 and the highest is 48, but we reverse the scale, so that the higher
scores indicate higher well-being. We classify the measure into seven ordinal categories to
be able to handle low and empty cells in the original index. GHQ-12 is one of the widely
used SWB measures in economics and psychology (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1994, 2002).
It is closer to being medically conventional than direct questions about "life satisfaction"
or "happiness" but is highly correlated with a direct report of overall life satisfaction or
happiness. Following the literature, we interpret this measure as a proxy for the latent
(experienced) individual utility (Kahneman and Sugden, 2005; van Praag et al., 2003;
Clark et al., 2008).
The distributions of SWB for rural, migrant and urban household heads in our selected


















































0 2 4 6 8
SWB
Urban
Figure 1: Distribution of Subjective Well-Being (GHQ-12) by Type of Worker
sample are reported in Figure 1. The overall shapes are similar to the patterns usually
reported in previous studies (e.g., Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998, for Germany;
Clark and Oswald, 1994, for the UK). The distribution of SWB is left-skewed, with very
few people reporting extreme low levels of well-being. Mean levels of SWB are 5:1 for
rural (standard deviation of 1:5), 4:8 for migrants (1:5) and 4:9 for urban workers (1:5).
That migrants achieved lower scores has already been studied by Knight and Gunatilaka
(2010a), but notice here that di⁄erences in average SWB between the three types of
workers are not signi￿cant.
Descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix Table B.1. It shows key explanatory
variables used in the SWB estimations and common to the three types of workers: age,
gender, marital status, being a salary worker, logarithm of worked hours, dummies for the
number of children at home, health status, years of education, (absolute) labor income
and dummies for social security coverage. We distinguish mean values for di⁄erent levels
of SWB (1-3, 4-5 and 6-7). Around 80% of the migrants are salaried workers, which is
larger than for rural workers, more often self-employed, but lower than for urban workers.
Migrants work substantially more than other types. Migrants are younger than individuals
in rural and urban samples (average ages are 30:7, 46:7 and 42:5 respectively) and more
often single. Yet the greater variance in marital and family status and age compared to
the two other types conveys that the population of migrants is relatively mixed. Note
7that potential selection issues are discussed at the end of the paper. The rural sample
contains mostly male household heads, while the proportion of females among migrant
and urban individuals are very similar. Urban people are more educated than migrants
and migrants than rural workers. Urban￿ s health scores are lower than for other groups,
and higher for migrants, which may re￿ ect di⁄erences in age between the groups. Urban
people earn more than migrants, who, in turn, earn more than rural workers (2;376, 1;625
and 1;369 Yuan/month respectively). Urban people acquire substantially more insurance
compared to migrants and rural people.
Table B.1 also reports further characteristics concerning migrants. In particular, the
presence of their family in urban areas, the proximity to other migrants and holding
long-term or permanent contracts seem positively correlated with migrants￿SWB. We
also use a variable on "hypothetical rural income" corresponding to the question "if you
were still in your home village, how much do you estimate you could earn every month?
(Yuan/Month)". The average duration of stay (years since migration) is 8 years and the
median is 6.9
3 Empirical Approach
The methodology used in this paper is based on simple regressions of subjective well-being
(SWB) on determinants including the income of a reference group aimed at testing relative
concerns. The SWB or latent utility function of an individual is modeled as follows:
SWB
￿





i￿ + ui: (1)
In this equation, SWB is measured by the GHQ-12 index described previously and spec-
i￿ed as a linear function of (log) absolute income, yi, (log) income of a reference group
k, yk
i, and a set of controls, Zi. The latter are potential determinants of SWB as often
used in the literature, including age, marital status, education, health status, number of
children, work hours, salaried worker (versus self-employed) and access to social security.
9Other variables, not reported, are available and concern the material living conditions and social
networks. We also ￿nd that average SWB is relatively stable over years since migration even though
migrants￿average income increases substantially (evidence available from the authors). This pattern is
very similar to the Easterlin paradox (see Easterlin, 1995, 2010 for a recent overview): we may expect that
immigrants who stay longer in host cities develop urban-speci￿c human capital, improve their ￿nancial
situation and hence their level of well-being; in fact, they also experience possible changes in relative
concerns and income aspirations that attenuate the increased satisfaction derived from improvement in
absolute material conditions. This is itself the subject of future research, but further motivates the
following enquiry about migrants￿relative concerns.
8Given the ordered nature of the SWB score, the model is estimated as an ordered probit
￿yet OLS results when treating the aggregated GHQ answers as a continuous variable
are very similar (see also Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004).
Results in the following sections focus essentially on the estimates of coe¢ cients ￿ and
￿
k. The former coe¢ cient is expected to be positive, so higher income should be associated
with higher levels of well-being. However, our main interest is the sign of ￿
k, which is
the impact of the relative income of relevant others k, and is a priori undetermined. As
explained before, the de￿nition of a reference group and the "typical income" inside this
group, yk
i, are crucial aspects in the present exercise (see Senik, 2009, for a discussion).
The main practice in the literature is to select the inhabitants of the geographical area
where the respondent lives, then to re￿ne by interacting geographical proximity with other
dimensions (e.g., age, cohort, standard of living, and combinations of these in McBride,
2001; age, education and occupation groups in Clark and Oswald, 1996, and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005).10 We follow the bulk of the literature, and acknowledge the possibly
ad hoc choices made to construct reference groups, but suggest a systematic exploration
of alternative orbits of comparison for the three types (rural, urban and migrants) and
alternative comparison groups for the migrant workers in particular.11 In addition, we
test di⁄erent "typical income" measures yk
i, either the mean, the median income or other
points of the income distribution of the reference group k.
10The scope of the geographical reference varies, from being as large as East and West Germany
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005) or American States (Blanch￿ ower and Oswald, 2004), to smaller areas such as
the primary census units of the American National Survey of Families and Households (Luttmer, 2005).
When direct evidence is available, spheres of comparisons may be more speci￿c, e.g., according to Knight
et al. (2009), 68% of Chinese rural respondents report that their main comparison group consists of
individuals in their own village.
11Reference labor income may be interpreted in a professional sense (see Senik, 2008). Yet, when
focusing on migrants, some of the reference groups we de￿ne may include people with whom migrants
have more personal links (community ties). Clark and Senik (2010) show that comparisons to family
members and friends do not carry the same informational value as comparisons to potential competitors
on the labor market. In the former case, positive relative income e⁄ects may reveal altruism. In the latter,
envy may con￿ ict with a possible information or signal e⁄ect when people compare to professional peers
in order to acquire information about their professional future. We try to disentangle the two aspects in
what follows.
94 Determinants of Subjective Well-Being in China
and Benchmark Results
Before turning speci￿cally to the relative concerns of rural-to-urban migrants, we suggest
in this section a comprehensive analysis of SWB in the three populations of rural, migrant
and urban workers. For this purpose, we estimate equation (1) for each type separately
and use di⁄erent reference groups as described below. Our aim is to check whether
standard results regarding the determinants of SWB apply when using the novel dataset
at hand. We also would like to check the sensitivity of our results to the choice of reference
groups (and of relative income measures).
General SWB Determinants Results of benchmark estimations are presented in Ta-
ble 2. The signs and signi￿cance of the parameters for usual socio-economic and demo-
graphic characteristics are in line with standard ￿ndings in the literature (e.g., Frey and
Stutzer, 2002, and the review by Dolan et al., 2008). Health, education, income, hous-
ing and marriage are some of the most often considered factors found to have positive
relationships with SWB (van Praag et al., 2003). We ￿nd a particularly strong impact
of health variables, all dummies other than "very good health" (the omitted category)
leading to a sharp drop in well-being. We ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of educa-
tion, yet the relationship is somewhat weak as previously reported (Fuentes and Rojas
2001; Helliwell, 2003). We also con￿rm a positive correlation between marriage and SWB
(e.g., Argyle, 1999; Helliwell, 2003). Often in the literature the presence of children does
not tend to increase SWB very signi￿cantly and sometimes exerts a negative e⁄ect (e.g.,
Glenn and Weaver, 1978). We ￿nd here a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect for rural workers
￿who incidentally are those less constrained by the one-child policy ￿and insigni￿cant
e⁄ects otherwise. A U-shape relationship between age and happiness is usually observed
(e.g., in Blanch￿ ower and Oswald, 2004) and is con￿rmed here for rural workers. When
controlling for all these characteristics, being female has no impact, except for migrants,
for whom it is negative and signi￿cant (Clark and Oswald, 1994). Salary workers also
report lower SWB compared to the self-employed among rural and migrant workers (Benz
and Frey, 2008). Unemployment insurance is positively and signi￿cantly related to SWB
for the urban people but does not seem to matter for rural and migrant people. This is
reversed in the case of pension insurance (rural households seem to value access to pension
systems). Injury insurance seems to positively a⁄ect the SWB of migrants, who are likely
exposed to more di¢ cult working conditions.
10Absolute and Relative Incomes As expected, richer individuals report higher SWB
ceteris paribus, with positive and signi￿cant ￿ coe¢ cient in all cases. It is noticeably
larger among urban workers, possibly denoting a more materialistic life in urban areas
(see Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010a). In these benchmark estimations, the relative income
is calculated as the mean income of all workers of the same type (rural, urban and migrant)
in the same local district (which corresponds to a city, for urban and migrants). The e⁄ect
is positive for the rural individuals (0:133) but not signi￿cant.12 The relative income e⁄ect
is negative and highly signi￿cant for the migrants and urban workers (￿0:352 and ￿0:384),
which implies a strong status e⁄ect of migrants vis-￿-vis other migrants and urban workers
vis-￿-vis other urban workers in the same city. The magnitude of the relative income
e⁄ect is striking and suggests the important role of relative income as a determinant of
SWB among migrant and urban workers. However, an alternative explanation is possible:
relative labor income may in fact capture di⁄erences in local costs of living, to the extent
that wages are correlated with prices. This may seem less of a concern when migrants
compare themselves with other migrants, but this is certainly an issue in the urban case.
For that reason, we control for spatial variation in prices using the data constructed by
Brandt and Holz (2006). We use speci￿c urban indices (for urban and migrant workers)
and rural indices. Results show that price levels have the expected depressing e⁄ect on
well-being in the case of rural workers only.13 Most importantly, we ￿nd that relative
income e⁄ects remain strongly signi￿cant for urban and migrant workers, and the order
of magnitude is very similar, whether we control for price variation or not (alternative
estimations available from the authors). It is more di¢ cult to comment on the magnitude
of relative income e⁄ects, but larger coe¢ cients compared to absolute income e⁄ects are
not unusual (e.g., in Knight et al., 2009; Senik, 2008).
Reference Group De￿nition In Table 3 we suggest a sensitivity analysis of the ref-
erence group de￿nition. Due to lack of space, we only report the coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿
k
(indicated as AI and RI for absolute income and relative income e⁄ects) in the three
separate regressions, standard errors and pseudo R-squared. For each type the reference
group is based on the same type (for example rural compared themselves to rural) and
various orbits of comparison. The ￿rst set of coe¢ cients where reference groups are of
12Insigni￿cant e⁄ects could be related to the very low absolute income level. Indeed, the relative
concerns may not kick in until the income level of the society goes beyond the subsistence level (Clark et
al., 2008).
13For urban and migrant workers, the e⁄ect is positive but very small. This is certainly due to the
fact that labor income and prices are highly correlated at the province level ￿and by construction at the
district level, as we observe only a few districts per province ￿for migrants (correlation of :62) and urban
(:81), less so for rural workers (:36).
11Table 2: Determinants of Subjective Well-being: Benchmark Results
Salary worker (0/1) -0.123 ** -0.105 ** -0.005 1 child 0.107 -0.117 0.200
(0.052) (0.045) (0.089) (0.077) (0.095) (0.254)
Hours of work -0.107 ** -0.337 *** -0.090 2 children 0.140 ** -0.085 0.373
(0.044) (0.077) (0.070) (0.070) (0.094) (0.262)
Age -0.054 ** -0.012 0.003 Weight 0.004 0.002 -0.002
(0.026) (0.012) (0.028) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Age squared 0.063 ** 0.016 -0.001 Height 0.008 -0.004 0.000
(0.027) (0.015) (0.032) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Female -0.157 -0.175 *** 0.035 Education (years) 0.028 *** 0.033 *** 0.021 **
(0.162) (0.046) (0.080) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011)
Married 0.401 ** 0.217 *** 0.374 *** Unempl. insurance 0.036 0.087 0.133 *
(0.172) (0.067) (0.106) (0.099) (0.066) (0.069)
Health: good -0.492 *** -0.469 *** -0.568 *** Pension insurance 0.169 *** -0.176 *** 0.007
(0.055) (0.033) (0.072) (0.060) (0.056) (0.077)
Health: average -0.863 *** -0.777 *** -0.959 *** Injury insurance 0.046 0.211 *** -0.045
(0.073) (0.049) (0.084) (0.069) (0.057) (0.064)
Health: poor -1.142 *** -1.172 *** -1.428 *** Log absolute income 0.116 *** 0.095 *** 0.165 ***
(0.162) (0.138) (0.180) (0.029) (0.034) (0.051)
Health: very poor -1.992 *** -1.457 *** -1.629 *** Log relative income @ 0.133 -0.352 *** -0.384 **
(0.525) (0.437) (0.182) (0.092) (0.117) (0.181)
0 child 0.077 -0.105 0.284 Spatial price index/100 -0.057 *** 0.008 * 0.003
(0.158) (0.118) (0.275) (0.018) (0.005) (0.011)
Pseudo R2 (oprobit) 0.043 0.035 0.040 Note: *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
R2 (OLS) 0.135 0.115 0.130 @ Reference groups for "relative income": same type (rural, urban, migrant),
# observations 2177 4878 1860 living in same district/city.
Rural Rural Migrant Urban Migrant Urban
12the same district correspond to the benchmark estimations in Table 2.
The next set re￿nes the reference group by considering all same-type workers of the
same district and age group. There is naturally a trade-o⁄ between cell size and how
precise the reference group can be, and this problem is particularly acute with age prox-
imity. We suggest two di⁄erent ways of calculating age groups: one using a window of ￿5
years around a worker￿ s own age, another with three broad age groups and hence large
cell sizes (under 30, 30-45, 45+).14 The relative income e⁄ect becomes weaker with the
former strategy ￿only the status e⁄ects among migrants remains signi￿cant ￿re￿ ecting
the fact that narrowly de￿ned age groups reduce the size of reference groups too much
to remain meaningful. Results are somewhat intermediary when using three broader age
groups, which we adopt in the remaining of the paper, yet the status e⁄ect for urban
workers is no longer signi￿cant.
Next, we calculate reference groups at the province level rather than district. This
does not make much di⁄erence for urban and migrant workers because these are sampled
in 15 cities allocated over 10 main emigration and immigration provinces (hence the
variation that generates the results across cities or districts is not much larger than that
across provinces).15 For rural workers, however, we notice that the relative income e⁄ect
becomes partially signi￿cant and positive. Previous results at the district level were
in fact not very informative for rural workers because of the very small sample size of
reference groups in that case (the average number of rural observations per district is 28,
compared to 325 for migrants). Arguably, the province level (or even the district level)
is too broad to capture precise comparison groups. Nonetheless, our estimates indicate
positively signi￿cant e⁄ects in line with Knight et al. (2009) and conform to the altruistic
interpretation of Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2010).
Mean or Distribution Points In the lower panel of Table 3, we depart from the
"typical income" measured as the mean income of the reference group. For migrants
we see that results are qualitatively the same when the median income is used instead,
showing that results are not driven by outliers that would push mean income levels up.
The relative income e⁄ect for rural and urban workers become signi￿cant when using the
median, whether or not the age criterion is applied. For rural workers, the median may
help to escape from the outlier problem and to capture better the local reference income
these workers may have in mind. The same issue may actually be solved here for urban
14Sensitivity analysis on cell sizes and de￿nition of reference groups can be found in McBride (2001)
and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005).
15Without more district variations, there is unfortunately no way we can prove that province is not a
relevant level when constructing reference groups for these types.
13workers, for whom the average number of observations per district (city) is not very large
either (115).16
Other points in the distribution, such as the 25th and 75th percentiles, may also be
used, but meaningful interpretations in that case require that reference groups are not
too small, for instance, the age criterion would have to be ignored. For both migrants and
urban workers in this case, the 25th and 75th percentiles lead to signi￿cant and negative
relative income e⁄ects (not reported); for rural workers only the 25th percentile gives a
positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect.
A last check is whether we should be concerned about asymmetries that may exist
in the way relative income a⁄ects well-being. Hence, for the last results of Table 3 we
use type and district (for migrant and urban workers) or province (for rural workers) as
the criteria de￿ning reference groups but allow for di⁄erent e⁄ects whether workers are
below or above the median income. For all types we essentially ￿nd that relative income
matters on both sides of the median and that the e⁄ects are very similar. Results are fairly
stable for migrants once age is added to the composition of reference group or once the
mean rather than the median is used. This lends some con￿dence about the robustness of
results concerning relative concerns of migrants, and the core of our analysis as presented
in the next section.
Additional Checks on Urban and Rural Workers Before turning to migrants,
we provide a last series of checks based on urban and rural workers. With the aim
of validating the empirical approach used, our purpose is to check whether the relative
income e⁄ects obtained above are meaningful or due to possible spurious correlation.
To do so, we test whether implausible (or irrelevant) reference groups could also appear
signi￿cant in our regressions. Based on the conclusions above, and to reduce problems
of cell size, we make use of median incomes and use province level variation for rural
workers. We suggest three speci￿cations. In the ￿rst, I, workers compare themselves
to people of the same type (urban to urban, rural to rural). In the second, II, they
are compared to a group which is a priori irrelevant (for urban workers: the income of
migrants living in the same city; for rural workers: the income of urban people living in
the same province). Speci￿cation III incorporate the two groups at the same time. In
Appendix Table B.2 (left panel), we report the results for urban workers. Speci￿cation I
gives the same results as in Table 3 (urban workers compare themselves to other urban
people of the same city, and possibly same age group). Speci￿cation II shows that the
16When group size becomes even smaller, for instance, when age is used, this is certainly an issue. This
would explain why, in previous results, we found signi￿cant relative concerns among urban workers only
when broad reference groups where used (but not when re￿ning using age).
14Table 3: Absolute and Relative Income E⁄ects: Sensitivity to Reference Group De￿nition
Reference groups: workers of
same type (rural/migrant/urban):
Measure
0.116 *** 0.095 *** 0.165 ***
(0.029) (0.034) (0.051)
0.133 -0.352 *** -0.384 **
(0.092) (0.117) (0.181)
pseudo R2 0.043 0.035 0.040
0.100 *** 0.085 ** 0.149 ***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.052)
0.098 -0.245 ** -0.108
(0.084) (0.108) (0.159)
pseudo R2 0.042 0.035 0.042
0.119 *** 0.101 *** 0.160 ***
(0.030) (0.034) (0.050)
0.085 -0.398 *** -0.194
(0.080) (0.098) (0.150)
pseudo R2 0.043 0.036 0.040
0.120 *** 0.091 *** 0.158 ***
(0.029) (0.034) (0.050)
0.223 * -0.311 *** -0.273
(0.127) (0.100) (0.201)
pseudo R2 0.043 0.035 0.040
0.107 *** 0.120 *** 0.170 ***
(0.030) (0.035) (0.051)
0.211 ** -0.741 *** -0.387 ***
(0.082) (0.112) (0.139)
pseudo R2 0.044 0.037 0.041
0.112 *** 0.112 *** 0.164 ***
(0.030) (0.035) (0.050)
0.130 * -0.532 *** -0.212 *
(0.074) (0.096) (0.111)
pseudo R2 0.043 0.036 0.040
And same district median income AI 0.103 *** 0.124 *** 0.083 ***
(0.034) (0.049) (0.065)
0.138 *** -0.543 *** -0.159 ***
(0.076) (0.100) (0.114)
0.142 * -0.545 * -0.137 *
(0.078) (0.101) (0.116)
pseudo R2 0.043 0.036 0.041
#Observations 2,180 4,878 1,863
Rural Migrant Urban















And same district & age (3 groups)
AI
RI
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. AI and RI denote the coefficients on absolute income and relative
income respectively. Two age group definitions are used: ±5 years around the worker's age or 3 groups (under 30, 30-45, 45+). Same type means
that the reference group for rural workers is the mean income of other rural workers only (possibly in the same age group). Robust standard









15median income of migrants has no e⁄ect on urban workers￿well-being. Speci￿cation III
con￿rms these results when the two reference groups are used simultaneously. Results
are robust to the introduction of age in the reference group de￿nition. The right panel
examines rural workers. Speci￿cation I gives the same result as when using province-based
reference groups in Table 3: a signi￿cantly positive relative concern among rural workers.
Speci￿cation II shows that rural workers have no sentiments for the labor income levels
of urban workers in the same province, and speci￿cation III con￿rms these results when
using both groups simultaneously.
5 Relative Concerns of Migrants
We now provide an extensive analysis of the relative concerns of migrant workers. The
main set of results is presented in Table 4. Due to a lack of space, we report only the
relative income e⁄ect for alternative reference groups (described hereafter). The ￿rst
column shows the main estimation results, as above, while the following columns show
e⁄ects for di⁄erent durations of stay ("years since migration").17 Among non-reported
estimates, note that absolute income e⁄ects are always positive, usually signi￿cant and
with a fairly stable size (available upon request). Other variables Zi are the same as before,
except with the inclusion of "years since migration" and the square of it as additional
controls. These variables are signi￿cant and show that SWB decreases then increases with
the duration of stay, re￿ ecting possible assimilation periods.
Rural Workers as a Reference Group Migrants are from rural areas, and so it is
natural to assume that they may compare themselves with rural workers of source regions.
The data allows us to link migrants to their home province, and hence, we use the rural
sample to obtain a measure of rural median income per province.18 As seen in Table 1,
we identify a total of 4;536 household heads that migrated from one of the nine provinces
where rural observations are available (another 732 migrants come from other provinces of
which we have no information). There are very few rural workers in provinces 6, 9, 10 and
when these provinces are dropped, we obtain a ￿nal selection of 3;752 migrants (and very
similar results when all provinces are included). As explained before, several forces may be
at play: a status e⁄ect may well exist for migrants who expect to improve their ￿nancial
17These e⁄ects for particular groups are obtained in a single regression where yk
i is replaced by its
interaction with dummy variables for years-since-migration equal to 1-3, 4-6, 7-10 and 11+.
18It would be interesting to use districts of origin rather than province of origin. However, the rural data
is a random sample that is not exclusively matched with migrants, hence only a few rural observations
could be found for the exact source district of each migrant.
16conditions in urban areas compared to home provinces. Simultaneously, altruistic feelings
toward home regions may exist (remember that the relative concern of rural workers when
compared with themselves is actually positive). The results reported in the top panel of
Table 4 show that the status e⁄ect clearly dominates, with a signi￿cant and negative
relative income e⁄ect overall. Perhaps more surprising is that this e⁄ect is of constant
magnitude whatever the duration of stay. It could be expected that after some years since
migration, relative concerns for home regions would fade away. However, we should not
forget that the sample is composed of di⁄erent types of migrants. The intuition above
may well apply to those who wish to stay in cities forever (57% of the migrant sample)
and for them the status e⁄ect may indeed decline over time. However, it is not clear that
the 43% who plan to return to home regions one day have strong competitive feelings
toward home regions. We investigate this point further below.
Given the ad hoc de￿nition of reference groups and, in the case of rural comparison
points, the very small regional variation (six provinces), results above could simply be
due to spurious correlation. In the following rows of Table 4, we suggest a simple way of
testing this. Instead of allocating migrants to their own province of origin, we assign each
of them to randomly selected provinces. With these implausible and irrelevant reference
groups, the relative income e⁄ect becomes insigni￿cant. This gives con￿dence in the
results above despite the small number of provinces used in the regressions.
Finally, migrants are in general younger than the rural people left behind. Thus,
the rural reference group compares young migrants with older rural people in the source
regions (potentially parents, older relatives etc.). One may suggest comparing migrants
with workers of the same cohort. Two obvious issues arise. Firstly, given the magnitude of
the migration phenomenon in China, it is possible that those "left behind" are too few or
too weekly representative of what an alternative life could be for the migrants. Secondly,
the age criterion may lead to the aforementioned problem of comparison cells being too
small. For these reasons we suggest an original comparison based, for each migrant, on the
reported hypothetical rural income of all other migrants of the same origin and age group,
wherever their location in China. This is an interesting comparison measure, which can
be used to construct proxies of (virtual) rural-based reference income of same-generation
workers. It transpires that this reference income leads to very strong status e⁄ect. We
cannot preclude, however, that this result re￿ ects rivalries among migrants of the same
origin and same cohort.19 We then turn to a set of estimations speci￿cally examining
other migrants as a potential reference group.
19In fact, the correlation between actual labor income and hypothetical rural income across all those
migrants is not as high as expected (only :25). When labor income is used in place of hypothetical rural
income, however, a signi￿cant status e⁄ect is also found, but with a slightly lower magnitude.
17Other Migrants as a Reference Group We construct several reference groups based
on "relevant other migrants", starting with migrants living in the same city. With the
large migrant sample, we can re￿ne the reference group by adding the age criterion or,
alternatively, duration of stay (i.e., we construct reference groups composed of migrants
living in the same city and whose duration of stay is in a window of three years around
a worker￿ s own years-since-migration). These three sets of results are reported in the
intermediary part of Table 4. We observe a strong status e⁄ect: migrants compete with
migrants. The e⁄ect is larger when narrowing down the reference group to the same age
group and stronger still when considering migrants with the same migration history. In
the last row of the middle panel, we add same-origin as a last criterion. In this case,
status e⁄ect toward migrants of same origin, with the same migration history and present
in the same city exists, but it is much smaller than previously found. These particular
migrants are potentially those who interact on a daily basis and form a community within
which altruism and reciprocal interests cannot be excluded.
Urban Workers as a Reference Group The third obvious comparison group is made
of all urban workers living in the city where migrants have settled. Since the migrant
sample is essentially collected in the same cities as the urban sample, direct comparisons
can be established. To proxy the relative concerns of migrants toward urban people, we
use the median income of all urban workers in the same city where the migrant lives. It
may well be the case that migrants compare themselves to the whole urban population if
their intention is to stay and prosper in the city. However, contrary to comparisons with
other migrants, the urban people may be slightly less comparable in terms of observed
attributes such as age. Therefore, we also narrow down this reference group to urban
workers in the same city and same age group.
The last panel of Table 4 points to a positive relative concern ￿this result, one of
the most prominent ￿ndings in this paper, deserves particular attention. First of all,
we observe that it is signi￿cant only when age groups are used, which could indicate
that migrants indeed build aspiration based on people of similar age. Then we suggest
several explanations for this positive positional concern. A ￿rst obvious argument could
be related to pure economic externalities. Thus, relative income acts as a proxy for the
bene￿ts of living with rich(er) people and in particular the presence of higher levels of
public goods and services in wealthy neighborhoods.20 If this was the case, however, the
relative income of the whole urban group (and not only people of the same age) should
20For South Africa, Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2010) suggest that at low levels of income or expendi-
ture ￿like most South Africans ￿the bene￿t of living among wealthier people outweighs the negatives of
being the poorest of a peer group.
18appear signi￿cantly as a public good indicator. Moreover, we check this point further
by explicitly including a measure of the quality of public services at the city level in the
regression. We make use of the 2009 survey released by the Shanghai Jiao Tong University
(RCEMS, 2009).21 We ￿nd that the public service score variable has a positive and highly
signi￿cant e⁄ect on migrant well-being. Most importantly, the e⁄ect of relative income
is hardly a⁄ected by the introduction of this variable, as can be seen in the last rows
of Table 4. It still has a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect of its own. A second interpretation
is altruism. However, and contrary to the positive concern found among rural workers,
it is unlikely that migrants develop deep altruistic feelings toward urban residents. The
third, and most likely, interpretation of the positive e⁄ect of urban income is the signal
e⁄ect: urban residents￿higher incomes may be informative about migrants￿own future
income. Evidence can be found in several studies, in particular for poor rural workers in
China (Knight et al., 2009), as already mentioned, but also for Russia (Senik, 2004).22
Countries where the degree of perceived income mobility is high also tend to generate
positive concerns related to this signal or tunnel e⁄ect. In particular, Senik (2008) ￿nds
that higher reference group income raises well-being in the United States and in the post-
transition countries of Eastern Europe. Senik also ￿nds that relative income is more
strongly positively correlated with life satisfaction for those in more uncertain situations
(as measured by the volatility of their income and the probability of losing their job).
This line of argument seems to apply particularly well to migrants in China, whose job
situation is on average more insecure than that of urban residents (on this point, see Meng
and Zhang, 2010, and Qu and Zhao, 2011).
We may expect a decline of this signal e⁄ect over years since migration. For one
thing, aspirations based on urban standards of living may diminish after several years in
the city. A possible composition e⁄ect may also enter into the picture: for instance, status
e⁄ect may play a bigger role for older migrants and counteract signal e⁄ects. Indeed, older
migrants have had time to develop urban-speci￿c human capital and ￿nd themselves more
in competition with urban workers. We indeed observe a slightly decreasing trend in our
result but it is not signi￿cant. As argued above for rural reference groups, the composition
of the sample ￿and the large share of temporary migrants whose SWB is likely less a⁄ected
by urban comparison points ￿may make that this trend is less pronounced than expected.
21This survey, covering 35 major cities in China, was designed to measure residents and private busi-
nesses￿perception and attitudes toward the quality of public service delivery in respective cities, covering
areas such as education, public safety, public health, infrastructure, transport, public policy-making and
enforcement.
22In unstable economies like Russia￿ s, individuals would take the reference income not as a comparison
but as an information measure to create future expectations. See also Ravallion and Lokshin (2000).
19Table 4: Relative Income E⁄ects of Migrants
-0.291 *** -0.282 ** -0.288 *** -0.299 *** -0.294 *** 3752
(0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112)
-0.055 -0.050 -0.054 -0.057 -0.056 3752
(0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112)
-0.564 *** -0.554 *** -0.559 *** -0.568 *** -0.574 *** 4878
(0.087) (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.088)
-0.349 *** -0.341 *** -0.343 *** -0.348 *** -0.351 *** 4878
(0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118) (0.118)
-0.394 *** -0.391 *** -0.394 *** -0.399 *** -0.400 *** 4878
(0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099)
-0.430 *** -0.440 *** -0.431 *** -0.425 *** -0.427 *** 4878
(0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118) (0.118)
-0.135 * -0.129 * -0.130 * -0.134 * -0.136 * 4878
(0.073) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
0.096 0.100 0.099 0.094 0.090 4878
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097)
0.206 *** 0.212 *** 0.208 *** 0.202 *** 0.197 *** 4878
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047)
0.192 *** 0.204 *** 0.196 *** 0.184 *** 0.179 *** 4878
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052)
£ Using hypothetical rural income
# Adding an index of public service quality at city level.
# obs. @ 11+
Year since migration :
1-3 All 7-10 4-6
Rural, random province
Rural, same home province
Ref. group
Urbans of same city & age group #
Note: Reference income is calculated as the median income of reference groups. We report only the relative income effects (RI) and their
standard errors in brackets. Absolute income effects are always positive, significant and fairly stable in magnitude, so we omit them to save on
space. Pseudo R2 are in range between .034 and .038. YSM stands for years-since-migration (we use a ±3 year interval).
@ When rural reference group is used: rural people are observed only in provinces 1-10; hence, we must select only migrants from these province
and the sample becomes smaller than in the initial selection.
Migrants, same province & age £
Urbans of same city & age group
Migrants, same city
Migrants, same city & age group
Migrants, same city & YSM
Urbans of same city
Migrants, same city, YSM & origin
20Addressing Migrants￿Heterogeneity Estimations discussed above were based on
the full selection of migrants. However, migrants form a very complex group with di⁄erent
migration histories, di⁄erent aspirations regarding urban life and di⁄erent outcomes. As
a ￿rst attempt to address heterogeneity among migrants, we use the question "if policy
allowed, how long would you like to stay in the city?" in combination with migration
history. A majority (54%) of those who answer "forever" stayed more than six years in
the city ￿the median duration time of the whole sample of migrants ￿while most of those
who answer "less than 3 years" stayed a short time (63% stayed less than six years).
Based on this information, we repeat the previous estimations separately on several
groups, distinguishing between recent and old migration (less or more than six years) and
between those who wish to stay permanently and those who prefer to eventually return.
Results are presented in Table 5: compared to previous results, more pronounced patterns
now emerge. First of all, only those who plan to stay, whether or not they arrived recently,
seem to be competing with their home regions. The status e⁄ect is declining with time
since migration, as we initially expected. In contrast, for those who plan to return to
their rural regions and have been migrated for less than 6 years, the e⁄ect is basically
zero. These people are similar to rural workers who have no (or positive) relative concerns
vis-￿-vis the rural reference group. Those who plan to return some day, but have been
migrants for a longer time, show a status e⁄ect but it is insigni￿cant.
For permanent stayers, the status e⁄ect vis-￿-vis other migrants and the signal e⁄ect
obtained with the urban reference group are also con￿rmed. Yet they are insigni￿cant
for those who may eventually return to rural regions. The latter may stay too short a
while in urban areas to switch their reference group and adopt urban comparison points.
For those who plan to stay, the status e⁄ect toward other migrants is especially strong
when they arrived recently in the host region. Later on, the reference group may move
toward a combination of migrants and other urban workers. This can explain why the
status e⁄ect toward migrants decreases after some years since migration. It may also
be due to con￿ icting feelings, as long-term migrants are part of a community possibly
sharing altruistic feelings and reciprocal interests. In fact, when the reference group is
local migrants of same origin, the e⁄ect becomes insigni￿cant for those who want to stay
forever. At the same time, relative concerns toward urban residents change, and the signal
e⁄ect tends to fade away. For one thing, migrant aspiration has been confronted with the
reality of urban life and the signal may lose its intensity. Also, as migrants assimilate
and ￿nancial comfort increases, the signal e⁄ect con￿ icts more and more with growing
status concerns toward urban counterparts. In any case, it is interesting to see that after
some years in the cities, the reference groups do not necessarily change but their relative
21importance, and the feelings toward each of them, do evolve.23
Additional results are presented in Appendix Table B.3 using information on family
background, job conditions, age and proximity to other migrants. For the latter, we use
some information about whether migrants live close to other people of same origin in the
city environment. Generally, those who do not live close to this community experience
a strong status e⁄ect vis-￿-vis rural income and vis-￿-vis other migrants in the city. Let
us characterize the four sub-groups represented in Table B.3. Among "recent" migrants
who plan to eventually return to the home region (top left panel), we ￿nd very little signs
of relative concern, except for workers who hold a permanent or long-term contract. For
these, who represent half of this group, the status e⁄ects toward rural workers and other
migrants is very strong, and so is the signal e⁄ect toward urban workers. For the others
in this group, only some status concern toward other migrants can be observed in cases
when these workers are weakly integrated in migrant communities. Interestingly, those
with temporary contracts ￿possibly temporal migrant workers who want to return back
to their hometown in the short-term ￿show a positive relative concern toward rural areas.
This suggests that these workers may be very similar to rural workers and form their main
reference group among rural workers of home regions. Those who do not wish to settle
but have been in urban regions for a long time (top right panel) do not seem to have a
urban reference group either ￿but show strong status e⁄ects toward rural workers and
other migrants when not integrated in migrant communities in urban areas. Among those
who have been migrants for less than 6 years but who wish to settle in cities (bottom left
panel), the most interesting characteristic is precisely the strong relative concern toward
urban workers: the sub-group of young workers whose aspirations are linked to careers in
urban regions are those primarily experiencing a signal e⁄ect. Finally, "older" migrants
who plan to stay forever (bottom right panel) have very little link to rural regions ￿except
when they are not close to other migrants in the city. Results con￿rm that the signal
e⁄ect is weaker for them than for those who plan to stay but arrived more recently.
Robustness Checks We summarize here a series of results based on alternative estima-
tions (detailed results available from the authors). First, we have included more migrant-
23Of course, we cannot exclude that these results also re￿ ect some selection among migrants. For
instance, those with higher beliefs, more ambition and experiencing potentially higher signal e⁄ects are
also those who may stay longer. Moreover, we cannot preclude that cohort e⁄ects play a role. Yet, and
despite continuous changes in hukou and migration policy, there is no clear-cut policy events that can
be isolated as a main driver behind these results. More precisely, there is no obvious policy that could
explain why those who migrated before 2002 (and hence have more than 6 years since migration in our
2008 data) are more susceptible to positive positional concerns toward urban residents.
22Table 5: Relative Income E⁄ects: Sub-groups of Migrants
0.016 -0.379 -0.481 ** -0.321 *
(0.235) (0.266) (0.216) (0.199)
-0.343 -0.203 -0.713 *** -0.426 **
(0.237) (0.261) (0.234) (0.205)
-0.201 -0.204 -0.093 -0.057
(0.150) (0.148) (0.163) (0.128)
0.068 0.157 0.376 *** 0.213 **
(0.090) (0.119) (0.080) (0.089)
# obs. for rural ref. group @ 858 716 987 1191
# obs. all other cases 1163 918 1270 1527




@ When rural reference group is used: rural people are observed only in province 1-10, hence we must select only
migrants from these province and the sample becomes smaller than in the initial selection.







Note: Reference income is calculated as the median income of reference groups. We report only the relative income
effects (RI) and their standard errors in brackets and pseudo-R2. YSM stands for years-since-migration (we use +- 3
year intervals).
Migrants, same city & YSM
Migrants, same city, YSM & origin
speci￿c variables related to housing conditions, job conditions, family background and
social networks in the estimations. Some of these variables have a very signi￿cant e⁄ect
on SWB. The absence of family, and one￿ s children in particular, is highly negatively
associated with migrants well-being, as well as poor ￿nancial conditions (proxied by the
question on whether a migrant is looking for a new job to improve his earnings). Large
social networks improve SWB very signi￿cantly. More importantly, the addition of these
variables does not change our results. The status e⁄ect vis-￿-vis rural workers is still
signi￿cant (magnitude of ￿:27 versus ￿:32 when these variables are ignored). The signal
e⁄ect toward urban income is barely unchanged (:17 versus :20) and so is the status e⁄ect
from other migrants (￿:38 versus ￿:42) or migrants of same origin (￿:14 versus ￿:13).
In another series of checks we introduce di⁄erent reference groups simultaneously.
Based on previous results, our favored speci￿cation consists of the following groups: rural
workers of the same province, urban workers in the same city and same age group, migrants
in the same city, similar duration of stay (and possibly same province of origin). The
main results are con￿rmed in this case and show that several reference points matter.24
In particular, the signal e⁄ect from urban income and the status e⁄ect from rural workers
are both highly signi￿cant. An exception, however, is the relative income e⁄ect from
migrants: it is not signi￿cant when included in the same regression together with the
rural reference group. The income levels of these two groups are similar, but we are
24Interestingly, results show that other migrants generate status e⁄ects, while migrants of same origin
do not (the latter e⁄ect is not signi￿cant in simultaneous estimations).
23asking too much from the data when trying to identify these di⁄erent e⁄ects. The status
e⁄ect from other migrants ￿and no e⁄ect for migrants of same origin ￿appears, however,
when used together with the urban reference group alone.
We also recognize that the previously de￿ned groups are endogenous to a migrant
worker￿ s own income level. We have therefore redone estimations while excluding it, in
the spirit of a jackknife estimation. Results hardly change.
Finally, we have not yet mentioned the selection issue, namely the fact that migrants
are self-selected people in quest of a better life. There are two main related aspects to
these questions: (i) migrants may simply be di⁄erent from the overall population, (ii)
these di⁄erences may a⁄ect the positional preferences of the migrants. On the ￿rst issue,
we have presented some descriptive statistics showing that migrants are indeed di⁄erent
in terms of observed attributes (younger, more often single, etc.). It would be possible
to control for these observables, yet one may argue that the selection issue hinges on
unobserved heterogeneity: migrants are in general suspected to be more ambitious (or
more desperate) than average. On the second issue, it is possible that migrants move
not only to improve absolute income levels but precisely to change their relative income
position or status in their source region (see Stark and Taylor, 1991). Hence, they could
be selected with respect to their degree of relative concerns and in the worst case, we
overestimate the intensity of relative concerns. More generally, we argue that selection
issues may be less of an issue here ￿at least compared to situation where a small fringe of
the population is examined. We have recalled the incredible magnitude of Chinese internal
migration: the current stock of rural-to-urban migrant workers in China represents around
18% of the Chinese population. This group of around 230 million people (about the size
of the population of Germany, France and the UK combined) is certainly worth studying,
and selection biases appear to be a second order problem in this context.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyses the positional concerns of rural-to-urban migrants in China using a
unique dataset collected in 2008 on rural, migrant and urban households. We use a sub-
jective well-being approach to identify relative income concerns that migrants may experi-
ence vis-￿-vis several plausible groups of reference. We ￿nd very suggestive evidence that
several of these groups matter, i.e., their income a⁄ects migrant well-being signi￿cantly,
and do so in di⁄erent ways. While the economic success of other migrants in urban areas
and rural workers in source regions depresses migrant welfare due to a well-understood
status e⁄ect, envy and competition con￿ ict with possible altruistic and reciprocal atti-
24tudes among migrants of same origin. More interestingly, migrant well-being is positively
in￿ uenced by local urban income. We rule out altruism and externalities as possible ex-
planations for this result and gather substantial evidence that this can be related to a
signal e⁄ect. Migrants, and especially young ones who aspire to settle and make a ca-
reer in urban regions, treat urban workers￿income as a signal for their future prospects.
Results show substantial heterogeneity among migrants: the relative importance of the
di⁄erent reference groups varies signi￿cantly depending on past and expected duration of
stay, on work conditions and on interaction with the environment and in particular with
a local community of same-origin migrants.
Given the size of the internal migration phenomenon in China, it is important to
isolate the di⁄erent types of social interaction a⁄ecting migrants, as they imply di⁄erent
policy measures and possibly di⁄erent social attitude and voting behavior. If comparison
e⁄ects dominate, social harmony requires redistributive policies and more equality. This
is probably less of a priority if migrants are mainly in￿ uenced by the prospect of mobility.
Again, however, a di⁄erence must be made between permanent and temporary migrants
￿and wise policy measures may aim at improving the living conditions of the latter in
any cases. A strong signal e⁄ect also relates directly to the political economy literature,
whereby expected future income and beliefs in social mobility in￿ uence inequality aversion
and voting behavior (see Benabou and Ok, 2001). If migrants were allowed to vote at
local elections, their political views may completely di⁄er from those of urban natives and
would a⁄ect the political outcome.
More generally, the present study is in the line of several other papers that suggest
de￿ning reasonable reference groups and test their statistical signi￿cance. Arguably, the
indirect nature of the evidence provided in this type of study necessitates some support
from more direct evidence on whom people compare themselves to (see Clark and Senik,
2010). The present study, however, suggests one of the ￿rst attempts to use the particular
situation of migrants in order to test the role of multiple reference groups. Future panel
data should help to understand better the dynamics of reference group formation, possible
switches in reference group and the di⁄erent time e⁄ects implicit in our results (age e⁄ect,
duration of stay in urban regions, cohort e⁄ects and speci￿c policy events in recent Chinese
migration history).
References
[1] Akay, A. and Martinsson, P. (2011): "Does Relative Income Matter for the Very
Poor? Evidence from Rural Ethiopia", Economics Letters, 110(3), 213￿215.
25[2] Alpizar, F., F. Carlsson and O. Johansson-Stenman (2005): "How Much Do We Care
about Absolute versus Relative Income and Consumption?", Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 56(3), 405￿ 421.
[3] Appleton, S. and L. Song (2009): "Life Satisfaction in Urban China: Components
and Determinants", World Development, 36(11), 2325￿ 2340.
[4] Argyle, M. (1999): "Causes and Correlates of Happiness", In Well-Being: The
Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, D. Kahneman, E. Diener, and N. Schwarz
(eds.), New York: Russel Sage Foundation, pp. 353-373..
[5] Bai, N. and H. Song (2002): "Return or Stay in Urban Area?" Beijing: China
Financial & Economic Publishing House.
[6] Benabou, R. and E. Ok (2001): "Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution:
The POUM Hypothesis," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 447￿487.
[7] Benz, M. and B. Frey (2008): "Being Independent is a Great Thing: Subjective
Evaluations of Self-Employment and Hierarchy," Economica, 75(298), 362￿383.
[8] Blanch￿ ower, D. and A. Oswald (2004): "Well-Being Over Time in Britain and the
USA", Journal of Public Economics. 88(7-8), 1359￿1386.
[9] Bookwalter, J. and D. R. Dalenberg (2010): "Relative to What or Whom? The
Importance of Norms and Relative Standing to Well-Being in South Africa,"
World Development, 38(3), 345-355.
[10] Brandt, L. and C. Holz (2006): "Spatial Price Di⁄erences in China: Estimates and
Implications", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 55, 43￿86.
[11] Cai, F., A. Park and Y. Zhao (2008): "The Chinese labor market in the reform era",
in L. Brandt, & T. Rawsi (Eds.), China￿ s Great Economic Transformation. New
York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[12] Carlsson, F., O. Johansson-Stenman and P. Martinsson (2007a): "Do You Enjoy
Having More than Others? Survey Evidence of Positional Goods", Economica
74(296), 586￿ 598.
[13] Carlsson, F., P. Nam, M. Linde-Rahr and P. Martinsson (2007b): "Are Vietnamese
Farmers Concerned with Their Relative Position in Society?", Journal of Devel-
opment Studies 43(7): 1177￿ 1188.
[14] Clark, A., P. Frijters and M. Shields (2008): "Relative income, happiness and utility:
An explanation of the Easterlin Paradox and other puzzles", Journal of Economic
Literature, 46(1), 95￿ 144.
26[15] Clark, A. and A. Oswald (1994): "Unhappiness and Unemployment", Economic
Journal, 104(424), 648￿659.
[16] Clark, A. and A. Oswald (1996): "Satisfaction and Comparison Income", Journal of
Public Economics, 61(3), 359￿ 381.
[17] Clark, A. and C. Senik (2009): "Who Compares to Whom? The Anatomy of Income
Comparisons in Europe", Economic Journal, 120(544), 573￿594.
[18] Dolan, P., T. Peasgood and M. White (2008): "Do We Really Know What Makes
Us Happy?A Review of the Economic Literature on the Factors Associated with
Subjective Well-Being," Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(1), 94￿122.
[19] Duesenberry, J. (1949): Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[20] Easterlin, R. (1995): "Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of
All?", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27(1), 35￿47.
[21] Easterlin, R. (2010): Happiness, Growth, and the Life Cycle, edited by H. Hinte and
K.F. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford: Oxford Economic Press.
[22] Ferrer-i-Carbonell A. (2005): "Income and Well-Being: An Empirical Analysis of the
Comparison Income E⁄ect", Journal of Public Economics, 89(5-6): 997￿ 1019.
[23] Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. and P. Frijters (2004): "How Important is Methodology for
the Estimates of the Determinants of Happiness?", Economic Journal, 114(497),
641￿659.
[24] Frey, B. and A. Stutzer (2002): "What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Re-
search?", Journal of Economic Literature 40(2), 402￿ 435.
[25] Fuentes, N. and M. Rojas (2000): "Economic Theory and Subjective Well-Being:
Mexico", Social Indicators Research, 53(3), 289￿314.
[26] Gao, W. and R. Smyth (2010): "Job Satisfaction and Relative income in Economic
Transition: Status or Signal? The Case of Urban China". China Economic Re-
view, 21(3), 442￿455
[27] Glenn, N. and C. Weaver (1979): "A Multivariate, Multisurvey Study of Marital
Happiness", Journal of Marriage and the Family. 40(2), 269￿282.
[28] Graham, C. (2005): "Insights on Development from the Economics of Happiness",
World Bank Research Observer, 20(2), 201￿232.
27[29] Graham, C. and S. Pettinato (2002): "Frustrated Achievers: Winners, Losers and
Subjective Well-Being in New Market Economies", Journal of Development Stud-
ies, 38(4), 100￿140.
[30] Gusta⁄son, B., S. Li and T. Sicular (2008): Inequality and Public Policy in China,
New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[31] Helliwell, J. (2003): "How￿ s life? Combining Individual and National Variables to
Explain Subjective Well-Being", Economic Modelling, 20(2), 331￿360.
[32] Hirschman, A. with M. Rothschild (1973): "The changing tolerance for income in-
equality in the course of economic development", Quarterly Journal of Economics,
87(4), 544￿ 565.
[33] Johansson-Stenman, O., F. Carlsson and D. Daruvala. (2002): "Measuring Future
Grandparents￿Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing", Economic Jour-
nal, 112(479), 362￿383.
[34] Kahneman, D. and R. Sugden. (2005): "Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy
Evaluation," Environmental and Resource Economics, 32(1), 161￿181.
[35] Kingdon, G. and J. Knight (2006): "Subjective Well-Being Poverty Versus In-
come Poverty and Capabilities Poverty?", Journal of Development Studies, 42(7),
1199￿1224.
[36] Kingdon, G. and J. Knight (2007): "Community, Comparisons and Subjective Well-
Being in a Divided Society", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
64(1), 69￿ 90.
[37] Knight, J., L. Song and R. Gunatilaka (2009): "The Determinants of Subjective
Well-Being in Rural China", China Economic Review, 20(2), 635￿ 649.
[38] Knight, J. and R. Gunatilaka (2010a): "Great Expectations? The Subjective Well-
Being of Rural￿ Urban Migrants in China", World Development, 38(1), 113￿ 124.
[39] Knight, J. and R. Gunatilaka (2010b): "The Rural￿ Urban Divide in China: Income
But Not Happiness?", Journal of Development Studies, 10(28), 471-493.
[40] Knight, J. and L. Song (1999): "The rural￿ urban divide. Economic disparities and
interactions in China", Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[41] Luttmer, E. (2005): "Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3): 963￿ 1020.
[42] McBride, M. (2001): "Relative-Income E⁄ects on Subjective Well-Being in the Cross-
Section", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45(3), 251￿ 278.
28[43] Meng, X., C. Manning, Li and T. E⁄endi (2010, eds.): The Great Migration: Rural-
Urban Migration in China and Indonesia, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing
Ltd.
[44] Meng, X. and D. Zhang (2010): "Labour Market Impact of Large Scale Internal
Migration on Chinese Urban ￿ Native￿Workers", IZA DP No. 5288
[45] PØrez-Asenjo, E. (2010): "If Happiness is Relative, Against Whom Do We Compare
Ourselves? Implications for Labour Supply", forthcoming in Journal of Popula-
tion Economics.
[46] Qu, Z. and Z. Zhao (2011): "Evolution of the Chinese Rural-Urban Migrant Labor
Market from 2002 to 2007", IZA Discussion Paper, No. 5421.
[47] Ravallion, M., M. Lokshin (2000): "Who Wants to Redistribute? The Tunnel E⁄ect
in 1990s Russia", Journal of Public Economic, 76(81), 87￿ 104.
[48] RCEMS (2009), Report on Public Service Indices of Chinese City, Research Center
for Economic and Management Services, Shanghai: Shanghai University Press
[49] Senik, C. (2004): "When Information Dominates Comparison: A Panel Data Analy-
sis Using Russian Subjective Data", Journal of Public Economics, 88(9-10),
2099￿2123.
[50] Senik, C. (2008): "Ambition and Jealousy. Income Interactions in the "Old" Europe
versus the "New" Europe and the United States", Economica, 75(299), 495￿ 513.
[51] Senik, C. (2009): "Direct Evidence on Income Comparisons and Their Welfare Ef-
fects", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72(1), 408￿424.
[52] Solnick, S., and D. Hemenway (1998): "Is More Always Better? A Survey on Posi-
tional Concerns", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 37: 373￿ 383.
[53] Stark, O. and J. Taylor (1991): "Migration Incentives, Migration Types: The Role
of Relative Deprivation", Economic Journal, 101, 1163￿ 1178.
[54] van Praag, B., P. Frijters and A. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003): "The Anatomy of Subjec-
tive Well-Being", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ,51(1), 29￿49.
[55] Veblen, T. (1899): The Theory of the Leisure Class. Digireads.com.
[56] Winkelmann, L. and R. Winkelmann (1998): "Why Are the Unemployed so Un-
happy? Evidence from Panel Data", Economica, 65(257), 1￿16.
29A Appendix A: GHQ-12 Measure of Well-Being
1- When you are doing something, do you find that
    1)Can concentrate 2)Attention occasionally diverted 3)Attention sometimes diverted
    4) Attention frequently diverted, cannot concentrate
2- Do you often lose sleep over worry?
    1)Not at all 2) Occasionally 3)Fairly often 4)Very often
3- Can you play useful part in things?
    1)Always can 2)Can play some positive roles 3)Can play positive roles poorly 4)Cannot play a positive role
4- Are you capable of making decisions?
    1)Always have own opinions 2) Sometimes have own opinions 3)Do not have many own opinions
    4)Do not have any personal opinion at all
5- Are you constantly under strain?
    1)Never 2)Sometimes 3)Fairly often 4)Very often
6- Do you feel you couldn't overcome difficulties?
    1)Never 2) Sometimes 3)Fairly often4)Very often
7- Are you able to enjoy day-to-day activities?
    1)Very interesting 2) Fairly interesting3)Not very interesting 4)Not interesting at all
8-Are you able to face problems?
    1)Never 2) Seldom 3) Sometimes 4) Always
9- Do you feel depressed?
    1)Not at all 2) A little bit 3)Fairly seriously 4)Very seriously
10- Do you always lack confidence?
    1)Not at all 2) A little bit 3)Fairly seriously 4)Very seriously
11- Do you often think that you have no value?
    1)Not at all 2) A little bit 3)Fairly seriously 4)Very seriously
12- Are you happy when you consider each aspect of your life?
    1)Very happy 2)Fairly happy 3)Not very happy 4)Not happy at all
30B Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics
All SWB<4 SWB=4,5 SWB>5 All SWB<4 SWB=4,5 SWB>5 All SWB<4 SWB=4,5 SWB>5
Salary worker (0/1) 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.89 0.86 0.91 0.89
(0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.45) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41) (0.31) (0.34) (0.29) (0.32)
Log hours of work 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.7
(0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3)
Age 46.7 47.7 46.7 46.4 30.7 30.5 30.7 31.0 42.5 43.3 42.5 42.2
(8.5) (8.5) (8.4) (8.7) (10.2) (10.7) (10.1) (10.0) (8.4) (8.4) (8.4) (8.5)
Female (0/1) 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.31 0.38 0.31 0.26 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.32
(0.16) (0.22) (0.16) (0.15) (0.46) (0.48) (0.46) (0.44) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47)
Married (0/1) 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.54 0.48 0.54 0.57 0.93 0.88 0.93 0.95
(0.15) (0.23) (0.14) (0.11) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.26) (0.33) (0.26) (0.21)
0 child (0/1) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.48 0.53 0.48 0.46 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
(0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29)
1 child (0/1) 0.37 0.31 0.38 0.39 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.83
(0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.49) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47) (0.37) (0.35) (0.37) (0.38)
2 children (0/1) 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.37) (0.35) (0.38) (0.37) (0.25) (0.23) (0.25) (0.27)
3 children+ (0/1) 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.39) (0.43) (0.38) (0.37) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.06)
Years of schooling 8.2 7.8 8.1 8.5 9.4 9.0 9.3 9.6 11.8 11.4 11.6 12.1
(2.5) (2.8) (2.4) (2.4) (2.5) (2.4) (2.5) (2.5) (2.8) (2.9) (2.7) (2.9)
Abs. income 1369 1153 1317 1485 1625 1495 1596 1732 2376 2067 2319 2593
(956) (691) (907) (1052) (1087) (908) (1055) (1200) (1678) (1542) (1662) (1735)
Mean SWB 5.1 2.6 4.5 6.5 4.8 2.5 4.5 6.4 4.9 2.6 4.5 6.4
(1.5) (0.7) (0.5) (0.5) (1.5) (0.7) (0.5) (0.5) (1.5) (0.7) (0.5) (0.5)
Mean health score (1-5) 4.1 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.3 3.9 4.2 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.8 4.1
(0.7) (0.8) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) (0.7) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7)
Unempl. insurance (0/1) 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.62 0.57 0.63 0.63
(0.28) (0.23) (0.25) (0.31) (0.33) (0.29) (0.32) (0.36) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48)
Pension insurance (0/1) 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.30 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.82 0.77 0.83 0.82
(0.44) (0.34) (0.43) (0.46) (0.40) (0.37) (0.40) (0.42) (0.39) (0.42) (0.37) (0.38)
Injury insurance (0/1) 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.52 0.47 0.52 0.54
(0.36) (0.28) (0.36) (0.38) (0.39) (0.34) (0.39) (0.42) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Specific information about migrants:
Hypoth. rural income 682 633 676 714
Lives with some of his/her children (0/1) 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.27
Lives with his/her spouse (0/1) 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.37
Lives close to many people of same origin (0/1) 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.53
Permanent contract (0/1) 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11
Long-term contract (0/1) 0.32 0.25 0.31 0.36
Short-term or no contract (0/1) 0.38 0.47 0.39 0.31
Years since migration 8.0 7.8 8.0 8.3
If policy allow it, would like to stay in the city forever (0/1) 57.4 49.8 57.5 61.2
# observations 2180 321 865 994 4878 886 2283 1709 1863 372 764 727
Rural Migrants Urban
Note: Selection: head of household, working, aged 16-70. Income is individual labor income in Yuan/month. Hypothetical rural income is the answer of migrants to the question
"If you were still in your home village, how much do you estimate you could earn every month? (Yuan/month). SWB is measured by GHQ-12 with values from 1 to 7. Std.
deviations in brackets.
31Table B.2: Additional Checks for Urban and Rural Workers
Ref. group: same district, type as indicated below Ref. group: same province, type as indicated below
0.170 *** 0.156 *** 0.184 *** 0.117 *** 0.118 *** 0.108 ***
(0.051) (0.054) (0.058) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
-0.387 *** -0.473 *** 0.402 ** 0.531 ***
(0.139) (0.144) (0.162) (0.199)
-0.145 -0.050 0.609 -0.112
(0.202) (0.205) (0.445) (0.532)
Pseudo-R2 0.041 0.040 0.042 Pseudo-R2 0.044 0.043 0.044
Ref. group: same district and age group, type as indicated below Ref. group: same province and age groups, type as indicated below
0.164 *** 0.154 *** 0.178 *** 0.120 *** 0.119 *** 0.109 ***
(0.050) (0.054) (0.058) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
-0.212 * -0.310 *** 0.223 * 0.375 **
(0.111) (0.116) (0.127) (0.156)
0.055 0.091 0.245 -0.135
(0.140) (0.140) (0.300) (0.348)
Pseudo-R2 0.040 0.040 0.041 Pseudo-R2 0.043 0.043 0.043
# Observations # Observations
























32Table B.3: Relative Income E⁄ects of Migrants: Additional Results
Ref. groups @ # obs. # obs.
Wish to return some day, YSM <= 6 Wish to return some day, YSM > 6
1163 -0.049 -0.359 -0.190 0.070 918 -0.404 -0.108 -0.226 0.126
(0.234) (0.241) (0.152) (0.090) (0.263) (0.268) (0.150) (0.120)
997 -0.202 -0.452 * -0.280 0.117 505 -0.865 ** -1.029 *** -0.361 * 0.218
(0.255) (0.260) (0.179) (0.094) (0.360) (0.354) (0.192) (0.165)
520 -0.728 ** -0.985 *** -0.586 ** 0.404 *** 370 -1.645 *** -0.680 -0.148 0.235
(0.343) (0.355) (0.247) (0.140) (0.464) (0.429) (0.242) (0.183)
643 0.575 * 0.275 0.115 -0.168 548 0.084 -0.026 -0.303 -0.046
(0.334) (0.355) (0.198) (0.116) (0.346) (0.376) (0.195) (0.169)
781 -0.088 -0.470 -0.305 0.139 88 -1.293 -0.988 -0.484 0.218
(0.298) (0.301) (0.207) (0.097) (1.240) (0.824) (0.550) (0.401)
132 -0.390 0.282 -0.314 0.231 265 -0.902 * -1.481 ** -0.316 0.284
(0.689) (0.855) (0.442) (0.326) (0.562) (0.726) (0.240) (0.271)
614 0.374 0.099 -0.111 0.174 519 -0.068 0.550 0.066 0.086
(0.315) (0.328) (0.208) (0.113) (0.387) (0.353) (0.221) (0.147)
549 -0.361 -0.873 ** -0.200 -0.125 399 -0.677 * -0.993 ** -0.413 ** 0.195
(0.364) (0.374) (0.229) (0.154) (0.415) (0.434) (0.207) (0.216)
Several migration experiences 260 1.088 * 0.935 * 0.461 0.128 217 0.643 -0.041 -0.264 0.333
(0.579) (0.548) (0.333) (0.243) (0.603) (0.558) (0.305) (0.258)
First migration experience 405 0.150 -0.778 * -0.391 -0.011 582 -0.394 -0.304 -0.402 ** 0.186
(0.440) (0.411) (0.247) (0.170) (0.330) (0.350) (0.179) (0.153)
Wish to stay forever, YSM <= 6 Wish to stay forever, YSM > 6
1270 -0.547 ** -0.678 *** -0.085 0.374 *** 1527 -0.361 * -0.483 ** -0.143 0.198 **
(0.214) (0.245) (0.167) (0.080) (0.199) (0.220) (0.139) (0.090)
1009 -0.345 -0.659 ** -0.376 * 0.421 *** 601 -0.037 -0.785 ** -0.201 0.152
(0.237) (0.281) (0.213) (0.087) (0.312) (0.330) (0.233) (0.138)
589 -0.433 -0.761 ** -0.129 0.528 *** 557 -0.257 -0.459 0.153 0.216
(0.289) (0.373) (0.306) (0.126) (0.308) (0.357) (0.196) (0.159)
681 -0.791 ** -0.835 ** -0.054 0.243 ** 970 -0.335 -0.404 -0.307 0.198 *
(0.326) (0.341) (0.203) (0.108) (0.270) (0.301) (0.192) (0.112)
790 -0.464 * -0.971 *** -0.381 0.447 *** 102 -0.702 -3.526 *** -0.860 0.462
(0.273) (0.320) (0.243) (0.095) (0.930) (1.031) (0.644) (0.311)
144 -0.289 0.549 0.506 0.443 473 -0.399 0.529 0.107 0.106
(0.743) (0.724) (0.505) (0.361) (0.338) (0.474) (0.273) (0.204)
565 -0.473 -0.813 ** -0.247 0.510 *** 752 -0.107 -0.062 -0.176 0.241 *
(0.352) (0.354) (0.239) (0.128) (0.303) (0.320) (0.194) (0.135)
705 -0.533 * -0.617 * -0.020 0.250 ** 775 -0.459 * -0.718 ** -0.110 0.153
(0.280) (0.349) (0.242) (0.105) (0.282) (0.316) (0.201) (0.127)
Several migration experiences 344 -0.518 -0.793 * -0.402 0.243 * 456 -0.799 ** -0.466 -0.487 * 0.190
(0.429) (0.473) (0.293) (0.147) (0.357) (0.422) (0.262) (0.150)
First migration experience 388 -0.119 -1.063 ** -0.069 0.099 757 -0.370 -0.237 0.048 0.258
(0.477) (0.443) (0.273) (0.150) (0.323) (0.329) (0.191) (0.127)
@ Reference groups are:  rural workers of same provinces, urban workers of same city and age group, migrants of same city and YSM, migrants of same origin & same
city and YSM;  YSM stands for year-since-migration.







Close to same-origin migrants
Permanent or long-term contract
Baseline
Kids/spouse stayed in rural areas
Young (age <=25)
Older (age>=40)
Permanent or long-term contract
Baseline
Kids/spouse stayed in rural areas
Not close to same-origin migrants
Young (age <=25)
Older (age>=40)
No or temporary contract
Close to same-origin migrants
No or temporary contract
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